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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
FRANKLIN S. STUCKI, ) 
Defendant and Respondent.) 
Case No. 14563 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
for Iron County, Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge, Presiding. 
MICHAEL W. PARK 
110 North Main Street 
Cedar City], Utah 84720 
Attorney for Defendant 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff/Appellant F I L E 
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Clork, Suproma Court, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN S. STUCKI, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14563 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent and appellant were divorced in Iron County 
on the 22nd day of May, 1973. Thereaftet on the 19th day of 
March, 1976, Appellant filed a Motion for Modification of Inter-
locutory Decree of Divorce. Said Motion was denied. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COl^ RT 
The lower Court denied the Motion of Appellant for 
Modification of the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the lower 
Court affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced by the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Interlocutory Decree of Divorce were signed on May, 22, 1973. 
At that time the Court found that the Appellant 
suffered from a heart ailment of considerable extent and had 
impaired health. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
para. 7). 
The duration of the marriage was eight years; no 
children were born as issue of said marriage and the property 
awarded to the defendant was accumulated by him prior to the 
time of the marriage. 
Plaintiff was awarded the sum of $12,000.00, payable 
at the rate of $300.00 per month in lieu of a property settle-
ment. (Conclusions of Law, para. 2). 
Defendant made the $300.00 payments regularly and 
on time and at the conclusion of the payments, plaintiff made 
her motion to extend the payments alleging a change of circum-
stances . 
At the time of the divorce the defendant was working 
for the Department of Employment Security, earning $750.00 per 
month take home pay. (TR. 32). At the time of the Hearing for 
modification the defendant was retired ahd was earning only 
$57.40 per month V.A. compensation and defendant was not receiving 
retirement. (Court Proceeding 7). If defendant chose to receive 
retirement from the state he would have received approximately 
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one-third (1/3) less than the amount he was receiving at the 
time of his divorce. (Court Proceeding $). 
At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was not working 
and the doctor testified that she might not even be able to 
hold down a part-time job, (TR. 7). Only after cross-examination 
did the doctor say that a part-time job might be a possibility 
(TR. 9) and the entire testimony of the doctor lends itself to 
the opinion that the plaintiff was not si^ ited for work at the 
time of the divorce. The plaintiff responded to questions on 
pages 20 and 21 of the transcript as follows: 
Q. Did you hear the doctor testify that 
if you had a job that you didn't 
exercise yourself too much you could 
work it maybe three or fouir hours a 
day? 
A. I feel like a person themselves have 
to judge the capacity to which they 
can go to and I feel like 1 can't do 
anything. 
Q. You don't want to work, do you? 
A. No. 
At the time of the Modification Hearing plaintiff was not working. 
At the time of the divorce, plaintiff did not have 
income in addition to that provided by defendant and at the 
time of the modification hearing, plaintilff did not have additional 
income. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
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In the absence of changed conditions or circumstances, 
the district court cannot modify a decree of divorce. Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, 89 U. 554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936). There must be a 
change in the circumstances or condition of a party since the 
entry of the original decree. Dixon v. iDixon, 121 U. 259, 240 
P.2d 1211 (1952). The change in circumstances must be substantial. 
Gale v. Gale, 123 U. 277, 258 P.2d 986 (1953). 
The Appellant must plead and prove a substantial change 
in circumstances in order to prevail. Plaintiff was not working 
at the time of the divorce or at the time the motion for modifi-
cation was made. Plaintiff had the same income at the time of 
the divorce as she did at the time of the motion for modification. 
Defendant was working at the time of the divorce and was retired 
at the time of the motion for modification, making substantially 
less income. 
The defendant has less income with which to pay and 
the plaintiff does not need any more than she needed at the time 
of the divorce. 
Plaintiff points to the fact that she may not inherit. 
There was no evidence in the transcript that she would inherit 
at the time of the divorce. 
Plaintiff states that the doctor stated she could 
work at the time of the divorce and cannot now work. The doctor 
did not testify when the motion for modification hearing took 
place and his previous testimony at time of trial leads one to 
the conclusion that he was of the opiniott that she could not 
work at the time of the divorce. 
These two items did not lead the district court to the 
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conclusion that a substantial change of circumstances existed. 
The attorney for the appellant affirmatively states that there 
is no question that it is a discretionary item for the trial 
court to determine whether a material change of circumstances 
has taken place. The case cited by the attorney for Plaintiff, 
Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (1975), also concludes that the 
Supreme Court will not disturb the decision of the trial judge 
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant did not sustain its burden of showing 
a material change of circumstances as required by decisions 
pronounced by this Court. Thr Trial Judge followed those 
decisions and a clear abuse of the discretion of that ruling 
has not been shown. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MICHAEL W. PARK 
Attorney for Respondent 
